Introduction
The WTO has acquired a huge expertise in negotiating complex agendas. But after five years at the negotiating table, governments are running out of time to save the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations. 2 The core problem is not that members are opposed to open markets, but that the current agenda is too big and complex to craft a deal. 3 Susan Schwab, the US Trade Representative hit the nail on the head when she said that a weak deal is worse than no deal at all -"if you do one of these once every generation, and your objective is to liberalize trade, why would you settle for something that doesn't do a whole lot to liberalize trade?" 4 So far Doha-lite has few supporters.
Institutionally, the WTO is caught between powerful competing interests and factions.
All governments wants greater access for its competitive industries, but each major trading country is committed to protecting its uncompetitive domestic producers. (see The popular perception is that agricultural subsidies are the biggest roadblock to successfully concluding Doha. In reality, the reason why trade negotiations are going nowhere is that WTO's rules and processes are inadequate to the Herculean task it has set for itself. In the 'medieval' processes of trade liberalization, the WTO is not only hamstrung by special interests, as much as by the realities of global politics which have roughly intruded on the theory of trade liberalization.
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The WTO grew from a proactive tariff reduction regime to a full-bodied trade governance forum over the previous decade. Perception is that trade liberalization is still driven by developed countries. But growth of the WTO's membership has significantly changed the liberalization dynamic. WTO law is rooted in an American system of common law and corporate regulation, 6 but its institutional trajectory is increasingly influenced by emerging economies. In China, India and Brazil, industrial capacity and an emerging middle class are sparking growth rates which challenge the economic superiority of North America and Europe. As a result, a new balance of power is emerging in the heart of the organization. shown, poor countries are most frequently the target of antidumping actions; they are less likely to settle cases and more likely to face high dumping duties. They are also less likely to bring their cases to the WTO.
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The case of China exemplifies the present policy quagmire surrounding antidumping. China has been the single biggest target of antidumping remedies in recent years because according to the WTO, it is a non-market economy (NME), a generalized category left over from cold-war trade politics. 17 In the past decade, China has lessened government controls, strengthened private property rights and met the standards for WTO accession. Ironically Russia, yet to qualify for WTO membership, has actually moved backwards on economic reform but has already been recognized by the US and EU as a market economy. NME status is a magnet for antidumping violations. Imagine that a Chinese firm produces handbags and sells them at home for $10 apiece and in foreign markets for the same price. Handbag manufacturers in the US, who sell their product for $25 apiece, complain to the Department of Commerce that Chinese manufacturers are dumping handbags on the American market. Article 2.1 of the Antidumping Agreement states that "a product is to be considered as being dumped, i.e. introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value, if the export price of the product exported from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country."
The usual test of dumping is a comparison of handbag prices on the domestic market and their price in foreign markets. But China is a non-market economy according to the WTO, which means that its industries are assumed to be heavily subsidized and this would drive down the price of handbags in the domestic market. There is a bizarre convergence between North American, European, Latin
American and Asian economies which all use antidumping as part of their trade and industrial policy tool boxes. In this super-competitive international environment, many members view trade multilateralism as a gestalt. What was a rising tide lifting all boats is now a zero-sum game. The WTO's non-performance in this area has had a corrosive effect on other areas of trade regulation, such as dispute settlement which we will discuss below. interests. If the WTO is to survive future rounds, southern countries will need to buy into the DSM in a way they have not in the past ten years.
The Evolution of Antidumping in the GATT/WTO System
So far, there is little optimism for a sea-change in DSM usage. Only 67 members are on record as having participated in at least one dispute, and 33 of these have been involved in three or fewer cases (see Figure 3) . Canada, US, EU and Japan file the largest number of complaints and responses -unsurprisingly they account for around 60% of the world's merchandise exports. The US is far and away the biggest user of the consultations system, filing at least 30% more complaints than the EC, and almost twice as many responses. Most users of the DSM have almost no actual experience with the panel process, and many developing nations are only tangentially involved in dispute settlement although they have large interests at stake. For example many developing countries were involved on both sides in the Bananas dispute, which, paradoxically was actually a market access battle between the EU and US. The US succeeded in reasserting its long-standing geopolitical interests in central and South American markets. The irony is that the WTO system was supposed to empower small trading countries and mitigate historic power inequalities. Instead it pitted poor African and Caribbean nations against small economies in Latin America. This case is typical of current dispute settlement dynamics in which developing countries are enlisted proxies for the hard power interests of the global north. Why has southern participation in dispute settlement remained so low, despite the rise of strong traders such as China, India, Brazil, Argentina and Mexico? There are two simple reasons. First, for many developing nations, post-colonial sovereignty was hardwon, and governments do not want to cede policy space to external experts. In this vein, non-governmental organizations also argue that local capacities should be developed by governments, not by multinational corporations that are more concerned with shareholder value than they are with the quality of life of southern citizens. 43 Second, the failures of structural adjustment in the 1980s and 90s reinforce the view that supranational trade governance is a risky endeavour with neo-colonial overtones. 44 Developing countries ceded a lot of ground in the Uruguay Round, trading services and intellectual property liberalization for binding dispute settlement and promises on agricultural market access.
Over the past five years there has been little movement on Doha priorities (see Annex 1).
And even the Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Program (JITAP), designed to prepare developing countries to access WTO legal processes, has made very little difference in the dispute settlement numbers. Ruggie's measure the WTO is gasping for air. 59 Woolcock, is deeply pessimistic about the prospects for raising rule-related issues in WTO negotiations given the current lack of consensus among members on textiles, agriculture and services. 60 Making better rules that will pave the way for growth and development is not something that members can expect to debate, even in the medium term. In the final analysis the WTO needs better rules to get better outcomes. But it needs better outcomes to stay aloft long enough to make better rules. There are no champions of reform other than the many NGOs, and trade bureaucrats do not listen to them. And so, as more deadlines are missed, it becomes increasingly unlikely that the WTO will pull out of its long, slow descent.
Conclusion
The The failure to make the DSM accessible to all is a systemic failure on the part of the WTO. If there is a generalization to be made, it is that the DSM has not created a power-blind framework for dispute settlement. But WTO rules are not written in stone. If they do not produce superior outcomes, they should be changed. This is the big idea that needs to migrate from the margins to the centre of the WTO's agenda.
Finally the WTO has to reflect the interests of the majority of its stakeholders.
This is the sine qua non of multilateralism and for building a sustainable democratic international order. The global south is not onside, the EU and the US cannot bridge their differences and with China and India flexing their muscles, trade Cassandras are predicting a train wreck. Much is in flux. What is indisputable is that the WTO is in a race against the clock and its institutional life is on the line. 
